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Abstract: We study the problem of two-user Gaussian multiple access channel (GMAC) in the
presence of an external eavesdropper. In this problem, an eavesdropper receives a signal with a
lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) compared to the legitimate receiver and all transmitted messages
should be kept confidential against the eavesdropper. For this purpose, we propose a secure cod-
ing scheme on this channel which utilizes low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes by employing
random bit insertion and puncturing techniques. At each encoder, the confidential message with
some random bits as a random message are systematically encoded, and then the associated bits
to the confidential message are punctured. Next, the encoders send their unpunctured bits over a
Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel (GMAC-WT). The puncturing distribution applied to the
LDPC code is considered in two cases: random and optimized. We utilize a modified extrinsic in-
formation transfer (EXIT) chart analysis to optimize the puncturing distribution for each encoder.
The security gap is used as a measure of secrecy for the sent messages over GMAC-WT which
should be made as small as possible. We compare the achieved secure rate pair with an achievable
secrecy rate region of GMAC-WT to show the effective performance of the proposed scheme. In
this paper, equal and unequal power conditions at the transmitters are investigated. For both cases,
we attain a fairly small security gap which is equivalent to achieve the points near the secrecy rate
region of GMAC-WT.
1. Introduction
Secure communication has been traditionally provided using cryptographic protocols in the upper
layers of communication systems. However, some recent security techniques are applied at the
physical layer to provide secrecy defined as physical layer secrecy [1]. In these schemes there is no
need to use secret/public keys and there is also no need to consider any computational limitations
at the eavesdropper. These are the main advantages of physical layer secrecy schemes in contrast
to classical cryptography schemes [1]. Wyner presented the wiretap channel model in 1975 which
consists of one transmitter (Alice), one legitimate receiver (Bob) and one eavesdropper (Eve).
He showed that there is a coding scheme which maps a messageM to a codeword Xn, and if Eve
receives a noisy sequence Zn, this coding scheme changes her confusion aboutM to the maximum
possible amount [2]. Thus, the coded message should satisfy the reliability for the legitimate
receiver and the confidentiality against the Eve, concurrently. Information-theoretic limits of secret
communications for different single user and multiuser channels have recently been investigated
[1, 3]. Moreover, studies show that different families of error correction codes such as LDPC and
Polar codes might be used as coding schemes to provide physical layer secrecy [4]. It should be
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noted that LDPC codes are also used in public key [5] or symmetric key cryptosystems [6] or as a
security enhancement technique [7], which are not considered as physical layer security systems,
and hence are not at the focus of this paper.
Secrecy metrics are typically defined based on the uncertainty of Eve about the sent message
conditioned on receiving the noisy sequence Zn, which is called Eve’s equivocation [1]. If asymp-
totic equivocation of Eve is equal to the entropy of the sent message, then a so-called strong
secrecy condition is established. On the contrary, asymptotic average equivocation of Eve equals
the entropy of the sent message in the weak secrecy condition. Measuring this equivocation for
finite block length codewords over an additive white Gaussian noise channel is difficult [8]. To
circumvent this problem, researchers provide another criterion. The security gap is defined as the
difference in SNRs, in decibel (dB), between Bob’s channel with the bit-error rate (BER) close to
zero and Eve’s channel with the BER close to half [8].
In this paper, we consider the problem of Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel (GMAC-
WT). The multiple access channel (MAC) consists of two or more sources which send messages
to a common receiver. In GMAC-WT, there exists an external eavesdropper that should not access
all users’ messages [9]. In other words, all messages must be kept secret from Eve. The MAC with
confidential messages has been investigated in various scenarios from an information theoretic
perspective for which some theoretical bounds have been derived on its secrecy capacity region
(see [3, 9, 10, 11, 12] and references therein). In this paper, we propose a coding scheme to
provide physical layer secrecy over GMAC-WT using LDPC codes which has not been addressed
thus far.
To provide secrecy through a coding scheme, a set of sub-codebook should exist for each sent
message to conceal the secret part of the message [1]. The secure encoder randomly chooses a
codeword from the sub-codebook corresponding to the message. Thus, a stochastic encoding is
performed from the message point of view. Secure codes should provide a nested structure with
random parameters at the encoders. LDPC codes with random bit insertion are one of the code
constructions that can satisfy these mentioned conditions [4]. In addition, puncturing technique is
an efficient way for hiding the secret part of the message [8]. In the puncturing procedure, some
bits of the codewords are eliminated at the transmitter.
Using punctured LDPC codes for providing security has been investigated in several studies
[8, 13, 14]. A random puncturing with concealed locations from Eve, satisfies the weak secrecy
condition for the binary erasure wiretap channel [13]. A random puncturing of secret messages
also results in high equivocation rate at Eve by assigning some constraints for the Gaussian wiretap
channel [14].
It should be noted that LDPC codes belong to the category of graph based codes, i.e., codes
with a graphical representation, which have been tremendously utilized in the last two decades due
to their superior performance in achieving the capacity of the most known channels. It has been
shown that for an LDPC code with code length n, the complexity of its decoder is an order ofO(n)
compared to that of Polar codes which is an order ofO(n logn) [15]. Additionally, performance of
LDPC codes under puncturing can be optimized for various applications [1], however to the best
of our knowledge, no such optimal solution for the puncturing of polar codes is proposed so far.
Therefore, as mentioned earlier, in this paper we aim to propose a coding scheme using LDPC
codes that can provide the physical layer security of GMAC-WT. We implement a nested structure
by considering some random bits as random messages at the encoders. Therefore, the encoding
process is stochastic from the secret messages standpoint. Furthermore, we conceal the secret
messages by puncturing associated bits in the codewords. In this regard, there are two main con-
2
cerns in puncturing procedure. First, a mother LDPC code for the puncturing should be selected
among the optimized ensembles. In this case, low information leakage rate is obtained at Eve by
utilizing a capacity approaching mother code [4]. Second, the way of choosing the bits for punc-
turing affects the security gap and the minimum required SNR at the legitimate receiver. For this
issue, we designate an optimization problem, which maximizes the secure rate and it determines
the optimal puncturing distribution. Moreover, we perform a random puncturing to compare its
performance with that of the optimized puncturing scheme. Note that, we assume that Eve has
perfect knowledge about the index of punctured bits in the transmitted codewords.
We simulate the proposed secure encoder to illustrate the results of our scheme for the practical
finite block length. We utilize the security gap as a security measure. As mentioned before, the
security gap is obtained from BER performance of the code, thus it is an appropriate metric over
GMAC-WT. We are interested in attaining half BER at Eve for admissible security gap which is
the same as what has been assumed in [8] for the Gaussian wiretap channel.
According to our simulation results, the security gap performance has been improved using
the punctured LDPC codes (compared to an unpunctured codes). As expected, the optimized
puncturing scheme results in the least security gap. Moreover, our simulation results show the
reduction of the security gap for random puncturing scheme. We study both equal and unequal
power conditions at the transmitters. Consequently, unequal secure rates corresponding to the
unequal transmit power of the transmitters are addressed. In all cases, significant improvement of
the security gap is observed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some preliminary concepts are
provided. We propose a secure encoding method based on puncturing the confidential messages in
Section 3. Modified form of the joint decoder and EXIT chart for punctured LDPC codes are also
described in this section. The last subsection of Section 3, explains the optimization procedure of
puncturing distribution on GMAC-WT. Simulation results of the proposed encoding scheme are
illustrated in Section 4. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5. Throughout this paper, upper-
case italic and upper-case bold-faced letters indicate random variables and matrices, respectively.
Additionally, lower-case bold-faced letters refer to vectors. We also use Y n to indicate the vector
(Y1, ..., Yn).
2. Preliminaries
2.1. System model
The GMAC-WT system contains two users with confidential messages denoted by M[1] and M[2],
as shown in Fig. 1. The BPSK modulated codewords denoted by Xn,[1] and Xn,[2] are the inputs of
the channel. The relations between the inputs and the outputs of GMAC-WT are given by:
Yn =
√
p1X
n,[1] +
√
p2X
n,[2] + NnB, (1a)
Zn =
√
p1X
n,[1] +
√
p2X
n,[2] + NnE, (1b)
where Yn and Zn are the channel outputs at Bob and Eve, respectively. Moreover, NnB and N
n
E
are individually independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) zero-mean Gaussian noises with
σ2B and σ
2
E variances. The former corresponds to the main channel and the latter to the wiretap
channel. However, these noises are statistically independent from each other and σ2E is assumed
to be greater than σ2B . By assigning power constraints p1 and p2 corresponding to each user, two
equal and unequal transmit power cases happen at the transmitters.
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Figure 1. A block diagram of a Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel (GMAC-WT).
2.2. LDPC codes
LDPC codes are a class of linear block codes defined by a sparse parity-check matrix H [16]. It
is represented by a bipartite graph called the Tanner graph consisting of variable nodes and check
nodes corresponding to the codeword bits and the parity-check bits, respectively. Decoding of
LDPC codes is performed by exchanging the probabilistic messages between the mentioned nodes.
The belief propagation (BP) algorithm implements the decoding process with a good performance
and a tolerable complexity [16].
Tanner graph can be described by two polynomials denoted by λ(x) =
∑Dv
i=2 λix
i−1 and ρ(x) =∑Dc
i=2 ρix
i−1 which determine the degree distributions of variable and check nodes from an edge
perspective, where Dv and Dc are maximum degrees of variable and check nodes, respectively.
λi and ρi are used to denote fraction of edges connected to degree i variable and check nodes,
respectively. The code rate R associated to the pair (λ(x), ρ(x)) is defined as follows:
R = 1−
∑Dc
i=2 ρi/i∑Dv
i=2 λi/i
. (2)
In addition, L(x) =
∑Dv
i=2 Lix
i and R(x) =
∑Dc
i=2Rix
i are node perspective degree distributions,
where Li and Ri are the fraction of degree i variable and check nodes, respectively.
In the puncturing technique that can be applied on LDPC codes, some of the encoded bits are not
sent over the channel [17]. Let pi(x) =
∑Dv
i=2 piix
i−1, denote a distribution function of puncturing
that pii implies the fraction of variable nodes of degree i that should be punctured in a codebook.
Therefore, puncturing rate is characterized as Rp =
∑Dv
i=2 Lipii. For the random puncturing, pii
with 2 ≤ i ≤ Dv is equal to a constant Rp over all degrees of variable nodes. It means that an
4
equal fraction of all degrees of variable nodes are selected to be punctured, and hence,
pi(x) = Rp ×
Dv∑
i=2
xi−1. (3)
There are twomajor asymptotic analysis tools for LDPC codes known as density evolution (DE)
and extrinsic information transfer (EXIT) chart [16]. EXIT chart analysis is based on the Gaussian
approximation and it is an efficient tool for determining decoding thresholds and thus providing
the optimum degree distribution of LDPC codes [16].
3. Secure encoding based on punctured LDPC codes
In this section, we first describe a nested structure for the secure encoders over GMAC-WT, and
then explain the joint decoder on LDPC codes. Additionally, we propose a modified form of the
joint decoder and EXIT chart analysis, corresponding to the case of punctured LDPC codes. The
optimization problem defined in this section results in the optimal distribution of puncturing. The
last subsection is on the security gap as a measure of secrecy.
3.1. Construction of secure encoder
Consider an LDPC code C′[j], where j = 1, 2 implies j-th encoder, with a codeword length n′j , and
a message length lj . Let kj be the number of the message bits that should be confidential. Hence,
a systematic codeword x′[j] of C′[j] can be decomposed as x′[j] = [p[j] m′[j] m[j]], where m[j], m′[j],
and p[j] represent a kj-bit confidential message, (lj − kj)-bit random message, and a (n′j − lj)-
bit parity message, respectively. Let also C[j] be a codebook which is attained by puncturing kj
bits of each codeword of C′[j]. Hence, the length of codewords of C[j], denoted by nj , equals
n′j − kj . The codebook C[j] only contains 2kj number of punctured codewords of C′[j]. Therefore
, punctured codewords of C′[j], denoted by [p[j] m′[j]], designate each confidential message m[j]
in C[j]. Accordingly, C[j] uses a nested construction with C′[j], i.e., C[j] ⊂ C′[j], and it consists a
stochastic vector m′[j] which is comprised of random bits. Secure encoding procedure is organized
as illustrated in Fig. 2. To encode a secret message m[j], (lj−kj) bits should be randomly generated
as m′[j], so as to [m′[j] m[j]] become an input of the systematic LDPC encoder of C′[j], as described
in [16]. This results in x′[j] = [p[j] m′[j] m[j]] to be the output of the decoder. Finally, the encoded
codeword x[j] = [p[j] m′[j]] will be transmitted by encoder j after puncturing the message bits.
Mother code rate, denoted by R
[j]
m , represents code rate of the mother code. Puncturing rate,
which is denoted by R
[j]
p , states the ratio of puncturing bits to the codeword length in a mother
LDPC code. Secure rate, denoted by R
[j]
s , is defined as the ratio of the number of secret message
bits to the number of transmitted bits over the channel. Finally, R
[j]
d denotes the design rate which
indicates the code rate of all transmitted message bits. In the above-mentioned parameters, the
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Figure 2. Secure encoding based on puncturing confidential messages of the user j.
superscript j denotes user j, j = 1, 2. The latter designing parameters are calculated as follows:
R[j]m =
lj
n′j
, (4a)
R[j]p =
kj
n′j
=
R
[j]
s
1 +R
[j]
s
, (4b)
R[j]s =
kj
nj
=
R
[j]
p
1−R[j]p
, (4c)
R
[j]
d =
lj
nj
=
R
[j]
m
1−R[j]p
, (4d)
where j = 1, 2.
3.2. LDPC joint decoder over GMAC
An efficient joint decoder on multi-user systems was first implemented in [18] using message pass-
ing algorithm. LDPC codes with BP decoder are appropriate for implementing by a joint decoder.
This approach has been utilized over a two-user GMAC in [19] and [20]. Their proposed joint
decoding is described by a two-user Tanner graph which consists of two single-decoders corre-
sponding to the transmitters. In addition to variable and check nodes, another type of nodes exists
in the two-user Tanner graph, called as state nodes. State nodes send the information of the single-
decoders to each other, in each iteration of the joint decoder. Therefore, the nodes of the joint
decoder exchange two types of messages among themselves: intra-decoder messages exchanged
among the variable and the check nodes of each single-decoder, and inter-decoder messages ex-
changed among the state and the variable nodes of both single-decoders. Intra-decoder messages
are associated to the BP algorithm, so based on [20], they have the same update rules as represented
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in (5) for j = 1, 2,
L[j]vi→ck = L
[j]
si→vi +
∑
ck′∈N(vi)\ck
L[j]ck′→vi,
L[j]ck→vi =
1
2
tanh−1

 ∏
vi′∈N(ck)\vi
tanh
(
L
[j]
vi′→ck
2
) , (5)
where L
[j]
vi→ck (L
[j]
ck→vi) denotes extrinsic information from i-th variable node (k-th check node) to
k-th check node (i-th variable node) in the single-decoder corresponding to the j-th user. Note
that, we useN(vi)\ck to determine the neighborhood of node vi in the Tanner graph, excluding ck.
Moreover, L
[j]
si→vi is the inter-decoder message from i-th state node to i-th variable node which is
a function of L
[j′]
vi→si and the received bit yi, and is obtained by (6) for the first user.
L
[1]
si→vi = f
(
L
[2]
vi→si , yi
)
=
log


exp
(
− (
yi−
√
p1−
√
p2)
2
2σ2
+L
[2]
vi→si
)
+exp
(
− (
yi−
√
p1+
√
p2)
2
2σ2
)
exp
(
− (
yi+
√
p1−
√
p2)
2
2σ2
+L
[2]
vi→si
)
+exp
(
− (
yi+
√
p1+
√
p2)
2
2σ2
)

 ,
L
[1]
vi→si =
∑
c
k′
∈N(vi)
L
[1]
c
k′
→vi .
(6)
State node updating rule for the second user is established in the same way as follows:
L
[2]
si→vi = f
(
L
[1]
vi→si , yi
)
=
log


exp
(
− (
yi−
√
p2−
√
p1)
2
2σ2
+L
[1]
vi→si
)
+exp
(
− (
yi−
√
p2+
√
p1)
2
2σ2
)
exp
(
− (
yi+
√
p2−
√
p1)
2
2σ2
+L
[1]
vi→si
)
+exp
(
− (
yi+
√
p2+
√
p1)
2
2σ2
)

 ,
L
[2]
vi→si =
∑
c
k′
∈N(vi)
L
[2]
c
k′
→vi .
(7)
The joint decoding procedure may be performed in a parallel or a serial schedule [19]. In this
paper the parallel schedule is considered.
3.3. Joint decoder for punctured LDPC code
Because of puncturing some bits of the codeword, we propose a modified form of the joint de-
coder to reconstruct them. Punctured bits in each encoder have no interference on the transmitted
sequence of the other one. Therefore, we attribute state nodes to the unpunctured bits that are
transmitted over the channel. For the case that two users have equal power, there is no difference
between the users, so the rates, code ensembles and puncturing distributions must be the same at
both encoders. In this case, the number of unpunctured bits are equal for both users. Therefore,
the forward messages of the l-th state node obtained from (6) (or (7)) are associated to the l-th un-
punctured variable node of user 1 (or user 2). Thus, the variable node update rule for unpunctured
and punctured bits are as follows, respectively:
L[j]vi→ck
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−pi)
= L[j]sl→vi +
∑
ck′∈N(vi)\ck
L[j]ck′→vi, (8a)
L[j]vi→ck
∣∣∣∣∣
(pi)
=
∑
ck′∈N(vi)\ck
L[j]ck′→vi , (8b)
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where subscript (1−pi) corresponds to the unpunctured bits and (pi) corresponds to punctured bits.
Different power constraints at the transmitters cause unequal rates and code ensembles for the
encoders. Because of various puncturing rates, the codeword lengths are not the same at the output
of the secure encoders. Therefore, different puncturing rates lead to an interference between more
than one codeword of each user. To circumvent this problem, we assign different code lengths
in LDPC systematic encoders such that the codewords have similar lengths in the output of the
secure encoders. According to the R
[j]
p , j = 1, 2 and transmitted codeword lengths of both users
(n1 = n2 = n), the mother code length n
′
j is computed as follows:
n′j =
n(
1−R[j]p
) , j = 1, 2.
Finally, the decoding process is performed by considering message exchange of the unpunctured
variable nodes with the state nodes using (8).
3.4. EXIT chart analysis on punctured LDPC codes
Tracking the mutual information (MI) between extrinsic (or a-priori) messages of a decoder and its
transmitted message is the principal part of the EXIT chart analysis. For this purpose, we assume
that variable and check node messages have a consistent Gaussian distribution with mean σ2/2 and
variance σ2 denoted byN (σ2/2, σ2). Based on [21], the relation between MI and the variances of
the exchanged messages is attained using I = J(σ) and σ = J−1(I), where J(.) function is given
by:
J (σ) = 1− 1√
2piσ
∫
R
exp
(
−(l−σ
2/2)
2
2σ2
)
log2
(
1 + e−l
)
dl.
Therefore, according to the (8a), we obtain the variance of the extrinsic message for unpunctured
degree i variable node, denoted by σ2Evi
∣∣∣
(1−pi)
, in (9a). The extrinsic MI for unpunctured degree i
variable node, denoted by IEvi|(1−pi), is determined as (9b).
σ2Evi
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−pi)
= σ2Esl + (i− 1) σ2Av, (9a)
IEvi
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−pi)
= J
(√
(J−1(IEsl))2 + (i− 1) (J−1(IAv))2
)
, (9b)
where σ2Esl (IEsl) is the variance (MI) associated to the extrinsic message of l-th state node and
σ2Av (IAv) is the variance (MI) associated to a-priori message of the variable nodes.
As the updating rule of punctured variable nodes shows in (8b), it only consists of messages
from the check nodes. Thus, the variance and MI of the extrinsic message associated to the degree
i punctured variable node, denoted respectively by σ2Evi
∣∣∣
(pi)
and IEvi
∣∣∣
(pi)
, are the functions of the
variance and MI of the a-priori message associated to the variable nodes, denoted respectively by
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σ2Av and IAv:
σ2Evi
∣∣∣∣∣
(pi)
= (i− 1) σ2Av, (10a)
IEvi
∣∣∣∣∣
(pi)
= J
(√
(i− 1) (J−1(IAv))2
)
. (10b)
Therefore, we derive total EXIT function for the variable nodes as follows:
IEv =
∑
i
(λi(1− pii)IEvi
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−pi)
+ λi(pii)IEvi
∣∣∣∣∣
(pi)
). (11)
Based on (6) and (7), IEs is determined for each user as a function of the a-priori variance of
the other user, denoted by σ2As, and the channel noise variance denoted by σ
2
N . Let I
[1]
Es be for the
first user as mentioned in (12). For the second user, it is simply obtained by converting the user’s
index 1 to 2 and vice versa. Hence, it is omitted here for brevity.
I
[1]
Es
= 1
2
J


√√√√2F [1]+
(
1
2
∑
i
L
[2]
i i(1 − pi
[2]
i )(J
−1
(
I
[2]
Av
)
)2, σ2
N
)

+ 1
2
J


√√√√2F [1]−
(
1
2
∑
i
L
[2]
i i(1 − pi
[2]
i )(J
−1
(
I
[2]
Av
)
)2, σ2
N
) .
(12)
Note that, F
[j]
+ and F
[j]
− are defined in (13) for user j, cf. at the bottom of the next page. F
[j]
+
is associated to the +1 and +1 messages and F
[j]
− is associated to the +1 and −1 messages at the
first and the second transmitters, respectively and are denoted in [20]. Moreover, the superscripts
[j], in (12), where j = 1, 2, for Li, pii and IAv denote those for user j.
EXIT function of the check nodes is also the same as the single-decoder case [21], because of
employing the same updating rules. Therefore, the extrinsic MI of check nodes, denoted by IEc, is
as follows:
IEc =
∑
k
ρk
[
1− J
(√
(k − 1) (J−1(1− IAc))2
)]
, (14)
where IAc is the a-priori MI of the check nodes. Since the extrinsic message of the check nodes
is an a-priori message for the variable nodes, i.e., IEc = IAv, a sufficient condition for successful
decoding is IAc < IEv.
F
[1]
+ (µ) =
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−z
2
log
(
1+exp(
√
4µ+8p2z+µ+2p2)
1+exp(−√4µ+8p2z−µ−2p2−4√p1√p2)
)
dz − µ+ 2 (p1 − p2)
F
[1]
− (µ) =
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−z
2
log
(
1+exp(−√4µ+8p2z−µ−2p2)
1+exp(
√
4µ+8p2z+µ+2p2−4√p1√p2)
)
dz + µ+ 2
(√
p1 −
√
p2
)2
F
[2]
+ (µ) =
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−z
2
log
(
1+exp(
√
4µ+8p1z+µ+2p1)
1+exp(−√4µ+8p1z−µ−2p1−4√p1√p2)
)
dz − µ+ 2 (p2 − p1)
F
[2]
− (µ) =
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−z
2
log
(
1+exp(
√
4µ+8p1z+µ+2p1−4√p1√p2)
1+exp(−
√
4µ+8p1z−µ−2p1)
)
dz − µ− 2(√p2 −√p1)2
(13)
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3.5. Optimizing puncturing distribution
It has been shown in [17] and [22] that puncturing the optimized degree distribution of LDPC
codes has nearly equal performance as the mother code with the same code rate. Hence, we employ
the optimized degree distribution of LDPC codes over GMAC as a mother code which performs
close to the theoretical limits [20]. Then, we obtain the optimized puncturing distribution for the
considered mother code.
The optimization criterion is to maximize the puncturing rate which leads to the maximum
secure rate, for each user. For a given decoding threshold, we can define a linear optimization
problem to determine pi
[j]
i for j = 1, 2, as follows:
max
pi
[j]
i
Dv∑
i=2
L
[j]
i pi
[j]
i (15)
subject to I
[j]
Ac <
Dv∑
i=2
λ
[j]
i pi
[j]
i I
i,[j]
Ev
∣∣∣∣∣
(pi)
(16)
+ λ
[j]
i
(
1− pi[j]i
)
I
i,[j]
Ev
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−pi)
,
Dv∑
i=2
L
[j]
i pi
[j]
i ≤ R[j]m , (17)
pi
[j]
i ≥ 0, i = 2, ..., Dv, (18)
pi
[j]
i ≤ 1, i = 2, ..., Dv, (19)
pi
[j]
i = 0, {i|λi = 0} . (20)
In the above, (16) is the condition which leads to the decoder’s convergence under the stable
fixed-point IEv = 1 that corresponds to the zero error rate constraint. As mentioned before, the
maximum amount of puncturing rate is equal to Rm, so the constraint (17) is inevitable. The pii is
the fraction of punctured degree i variable nodes, thus it satisfies (18), (19) and (20).
The optimization procedure is accomplished for each user, but the puncturing distribution of one
user affects the optimization of the other user. Therefore, we start with an initial distribution for
one user and perform the optimization procedure for the other one. Then, the obtained distribution
is again used to optimize the next user. This process is repeated until the same result is achieved in
the consecutive iterations.
3.6. Security measurement metric
To measure the level of secrecy in the proposed scheme, we use the security gap. As formerly
mentioned, the security gap is defined based on BER of the secret message after decoding. Let
PBe and P
E
e denote BER values of a secret message at Bob’s and Eve’s decoders, respectively.
If Eve decodes the secret message with half error probability, she will not be able to extract any
information about it. Hence, the variance of Eve’s channel noise σ2E should be greater than or
equal to a minimum value σ2Emin . In spite of that, a reasonable level of reliability based on BER,
should be established at the desired decoder. Therefore, the variance of Bob’s channel noise σ2B
should be less than or equal to a maximum value σ2Bmax . In summary, the following conditions on
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the reliability and the security should be satisfied to have a reliable and a secure communication.
PEe ≥ 0.5 ⇒ σ2E ≥ σ2Emin, (21a)
PBe ≤ 10−5 ⇒ σ2B ≤ σ2Bmax . (21b)
The security gap denoted by g is the difference of two limiting values of variances σ2Emin and
σ2Bmax in dB scale, and hence is given by:
g = 10 log10(
σ2Emin
σ2Bmax
) dB.
Conceptually, the security gap determines the quantity of an additional noise on the wiretap channel
which is required to have the secure and the reliable communication, simultaneously. In this paper,
we choose the security rate and the design rate of codes associated to the power constraints of the
transmitters, such that the reliability (security) condition is satisfied for the same σ2Bmax (σ
2
Emin
) value
on the confidential (eavesdropped) message. Therefore, the security gap can be calculated based
on SNR values as calculated in [8].
4. Simulation results and discussion
In order to demonstrate the performance of our proposed scheme, we simulate the proposed secure
coding scheme in this section. We consider both equal and unequal transmit power cases.
For a given Rs of each user, the desired Rp is obtained from (4b). We calculate the puncturing
distribution in two ways:
• By applying the optimal puncturing distribution derived by (15) for a proper decoding
threshold which results in the desired Rp.
• By using a random puncturing distribution associated to Rp derived by (3).
It should be noted that the mother code rate Rm determines length of the random message and
the parity bits. Actually, as (4b) shows, we can assignRm to its maximum valueRp by eliminating
the random message. Hence, in this case, the absence of random parameters in the encoder results
in the maximum security gap. Moreover, selecting Rm equals Rp maximizes Rd which leads to
minimize the SNR loss. On the contrary, increasing the number of random bits reduces the security
gap. This also leads the parity bits to decrease, and accordingly Rd which imposes an extra SNR
loss on the performance of the code. IfRm is equal toRs, the number of random bits is sufficient to
attain a low security gap, while the SNR loss is also admissible, cf. simulations in [8]. Therefore,
we also consider the equality of Rm and Rs in our simulations.
After selecting Rm, the optimized finite-length LDPC code, based on [20], is applied as a
mother code. Then, the punctured codewords derived by an optimized or a random puncturing are
transmitted over GMAC-WT. Bob and Eve extract secret messages from the received sequences at
their receivers. Eventually, the required security gap is computed based on the amount of intended
BERs at the receivers.
In the following simulations, we set the code lengths n1 and n2 equal 10
4, and PBe,max = 10
−5
in all examples.
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4.1. Equal power case
We first impose an equal transmit power constraint corresponding to equal secure rates for both
users. The same mother codes are also applied for both users.
Let p1 and p2 equal 1 and Rs be 0.3333. The optimized degree distributions of mother codes
are as follows:
λ[1],[2](x) =0.1993x+ 0.2796x2 + 0.0096x8 + 0.1814x10
+ 0.0113x15 + 0.3188x99,
ρ[1],[2](x) =x6.
(22)
According to Rs and using (4b), the desired puncturing rate Rp is 0.25. The desired Rp is
obtained by considering a decoding threshold equals 0.9151 in the optimization procedure (15).
Thus, the associated puncturing distributions for both encoders are given by:
pi[1],[2](x) =0.283x+ 0.2723x2. (23)
By applying (4d) and for the above mentioned parameters, the design rateRd is equal to 0.4444.
We also apply a random puncturing distribution defined in (3) for Rp = 0.25 to compare its perfor-
mance with that of the optimized puncturing distribution. In Fig. 3, the BER of a standard encoder
(without puncturing) is demonstrated in terms of SNR. Since there is the same BER performance
for both users’ messages, we only illustrate the performance of one code for the sake of simplicity.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the BER curves of Eve against the security gap. It confirms that our pro-
posed secure encoder reduces the security gap significantly. Specially, using the optimized punc-
turing distributions at the secure encoders, increases the BER of Eve to get its highest value. If
Eve’s BER values PEe are considered as 0.45, 0.48 and 0.49, the security gap values will be 3, 3.2
and 5.5 dB for the optimized punctured case, and 5.3, 5.6 and 7.2 dB for the random punctured
case, respectively. Moreover, the corresponding security gaps will be 22.3, 30.3 and 36.3 dB for
the unpunctured message case and the same BER values, respectively. This improvement is at the
expense of increasing the minimum amount of Bob’s SNR for attaining a reliable communication
in the punctured case compared to the unpunctured one. This SNR difference, which is also called
the SNR loss, means that the users should spend more power at the transmitters. As seen in Fig. 3,
the amount of the SNR loss is about 3.2 dB for the optimized punctured case and 7.9 dB for the
random punctured case, respectively.
The best theoretical achievable secrecy rate region derived so far for the two user GMAC-
WT was illustrated in [9, 23]. As it can be seen in Fig. 3, σ2B = 0.1778 and σ
2
E = 1.1482 are
calculated for the optimized puncturing case with PBe = 10
−5, PEe ≃ 0.5, p1 = p2 = 1. Similarly,
σ2B = 0.0603 and σ
2
E = 1.2303 are obtained for the random puncturing case. Thus, the achievable
secrecy rate regions for the optimized and the random puncturing parameters are illustrated in
Fig. 5. We also show the achieved rate pair using the proposed secure encoder in the same figure.
The achieved sum-rate is 0.0648 bits away from the maximum sum-rate on the secrecy rate region
for the optimized puncturing case. Likewise, the difference between the maximum sum-rate on the
secrecy rate region and the achieved sum-rate is about 0.1437 bits for the random puncturing.
4.2. Unequal power case
Unequal transmit powers are considered in this part, where p1 and p2 are 1.5 and 0.5, respectively.
Secure rates are also assumed as R
[1]
s = 0.4451 and R
[2]
s = 0.2215. Let Rm = Rs, then the opti-
mized degree distributions for the mother code rates R
[1]
m = 0.4451 and R
[2]
m = 0.2215 associated
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Figure 3. BER versus SNR of equal power case, with the security rates R
[1]
s = R
[2]
s = 0.3333 for
the optimized punctured, the randomly punctured and unpunctured codewords.
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to user 1 and user 2 are as follows, respectively:
λ[1](x) =0.1559x+ 0.2974x2 + 0.0394x7 + 0.1305x8
+ 0.3768x99,
ρ[1](x) =x8,
(24)
λ[2](x) =0.1657x+ 0.2298x2 + 0.0907x6 + 0.0521x7
+ 0.4617x99,
ρ[2](x) =x6.
(25)
For the given secure rates R
[1]
s = 0.4451 and R
[2]
s = 0.2215, the desired puncturing rates
are calculated as R
[1]
p = 0.308 and R
[2]
p = 0.1814 using (4b), respectively. The desired puncturing
distributions are attained from the optimization procedure (15) by assigning the decoding threshold
equals 0.8998. The puncturing distributions for user 1 and user 2 are given by:
pi[1](x) =0.3431x+ 0.3029x2 + 0.2391x8 + 0.3865x99,
pi[2](x) =0.2828x+ 0.1239x2 + 0.0774x99.
(26)
The associated design rates are calculated as R
[1]
d = 0.6432 and R
[2]
d = 0.2706 by using (4d) for
user 1 and 2, respectively. In this case, each encoder punctures the codewords by different rates.
Hence, we have to select the length of codewords according to the puncturing rates. Thus, n′1 and
n′2 are considered as 14451 and 12216, respectively. However, the length of punctured codewords
for both users equals 104. According to our simulation results, the BER performance of both users
in terms of SNR are depicted in Fig. 6. Furthermore, Fig. 7 exhibits the BER curves corresponding
to Eve versus the security gap. Using the proposed scheme for the unequal transmit power case
reduces the security gap compared to the unpunctured scheme. Moreover, the optimized puncturing
distribution causes extra reduction in the security gap compared to the random puncturing scheme.
If Eve’s BER values PEe are considered to be 0.45, 0.48 and 0.49, the security gap values will be
1.9, 2.4 and 3.4 dB for the optimized punctured messages, and 2.5, 3.2 and 4.8 dB for the random
punctured messages, respectively. Additionally, they are respectively equal to 18.5, 27.5 and 30.5
dB for the unpunctured messages. As seen in Fig. 6, the SNR loss is about 4 dB and 4.4 dB for the
optimized and the random puncturing methods, respectively.
Similar to the equal power case, we set PBe to 10
−5 and PEe to 0.5. Hence, according to Fig 6,
the noise variances of Bob’s channel are obtained as 0.3631 and 0.3311 for the optimized and the
random puncturing schemes, respectively. The noise variances of Eve’s channel are also equal to
0.5136 and 1.6218 for the optimized and the random puncturingmethods, respectively. The secrecy
rate region for the mentioned cases are illustrated in Fig. 8. It is apparent that the obtained sum-
rate using the proposed secure encoder gets closer to the rate region by employing the optimized
puncturing. In addition, the gap between the maximum sum-rate on the secrecy rate region and the
achieved sum-rate is 0.0145 bits. The difference between maximum sum-rate on the secrecy rate
region and the achieved sum-rate is about 0.0891 bits for the random puncturing.
4.3. Complexity of the secure encoder
The main result in [16] shows that the encoding process of LDPC codes is performed with com-
plexity of O(n + g2enc), where genc is referred to the encoding gap. As shown in [8], the genc is
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a proportional coefficient of n and this coefficient is computed related to the puncturing pattern
and the puncturing rate. Using two encoders in GMAC-WT, make the complexity of our proposed
secure encoding scheme twice that of a single user scenario.
5. Conclusion
We have proposed an efficient scheme for sending confidential messages over the GMAC by em-
ploying LDPC codes. In this scheme, a secure encoder has been proposed by considering some
random bits and puncturing the secret bits at each transmitter. To reconstruct the secret bits, we
have presented a modified form of the joint decoder and its associated EXIT chart analysis. The
optimization problem has been defined to maximize the puncturing rates and the corresponding
secure rates. The optimized puncturing distribution has been used to achieve the reliability and the
security conditions at each encoder. The security gap has been employed to determine the secrecy
level of the proposed scheme. We have used random puncturing to have a comparison with the
results of the optimized puncturing case. We have assessed the security level for both transmitters
with equal and unequal transmit powers. Confidentiality of both users’ messages has been provided
by the proposed method with a fairly small security gap. The comparison between an achievable
secrecy rate region and the obtained rate pair of our proposed scheme has been confirmed the
advantage of the optimized puncturing case.
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Figure 4. Eve’s BER versus the security gap of equal power case, with the security rates R
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Figure 8. Comparison between an achievable secrecy rate region and the obtained rate pair by
applying the random and the optimized puncturing schemes for unequal transmit powers.
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